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Recent jury verdicts against Rolling Stone Magazine and Gawker 
Media raise fundamental issues in defamation and privacy lawsuits, 
including who is a public figure, what counts as newsworthiness, and 
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whether truth is always a defense under the First Amendment. Using 
those verdicts as a starting point, I reexamine the democratic 
arguments the Supreme Court relied on to protect free speech and the 
press in New York Times v. Sullivan. I conclude that subsequent 
cases overextended the New York Times rule in ways that weakened 
its democratic foundation. I suggest three reforms. Regarding the 
public figure doctrine, courts should enforce the oft-quoted, but 
frequently ignored, requirement that private individuals morph into 
public figures only to the extent that they voluntarily thrust themselves 
into a public controversy. In regard to privacy torts, truth should not 
be an absolute defense, no matter how uncomfortable such a 
conclusion is to one reading of the First Amendment. Judges and 
juries will have to continue to struggle over norms of newsworthiness 
when truth and privacy collide. Finally, media attention to the private 
lives of public officials, however justified on occasion, has become so 
routine as to defeat what New York Times v. Sullivan promised—a 
press focused on the investigation and criticism of official acts. 
n this Article, I reluctantly argue that the free speech promise of 
New York Times v. Sullivan1 has been lost due to the ruling’s 
overextension. The original decision was anchored to the press as a 
pillar of democratic self-government and robust public debate.2 
However, later decisions pulled up that democratic anchor by 
assigning equal weight to press coverage of (1) public and quasi-
public (“limited”) figures;3 and (2) the private lives, as well as public 
conduct, of public officials and public figures alike.4 The result has 
been a privileging of publicity over privacy that rests on a 
questionable First Amendment argument that any true story is 
necessarily newsworthy. When technology buttresses this legal 
position with an ever-expanding capacity to uncover private 
information, we weaken the particular service a free press provides 
for self-government. 
My reluctance to criticize the “most important” free speech case5 
has to do with the vitriolic attacks on the press today. Adjectival 
bashing of journalists as “among the most dishonest human beings on 
 
1 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2 Id. at 270. 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 28–41 (public figures) and text accompanying 
notes 42–46 (limited public figures). 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 192–225. 
5 See infra note 17. 
I
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earth”6 or the “enemy of the American people”7 must give pause to 
anyone suggesting now is a fit time to reconsider the basics of First 
Amendment protection for a free press.8 However, I dare to do so, 
since I am convinced that preserving the press’s central role in 
democratic self-government is at stake. I argue that the press9 will be 
better able to defend this central mission if it draws in its First 
Amendment fort. There is, after all, a common sense distinction 
between the controversy that gave rise to modern press protection—
the civil rights contribution the New York Times made in 1960 by 
daring to accept an advertisement criticizing law enforcement in 
Montgomery, Alabama—and the controversies today over the 
newsworthiness of stories about the private sexual lives of candidates, 
officeholders, and celebrities. When we blur that distinction, we 
extend New York Times v. Sullivan too far. 
Even before the 2016 election, there were signs that the press was 
sailing through rough legal waters.10 According to The Gallup Poll, 
public trust in the press has sunk to its lowest level since the 
organization began to survey it in 1972.11 In 2016, a federal jury 
 
6 See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Matthew Rosenberg, Slamming Media, Trump Advances 
Two Falsehoods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2017, at A1. 
7 Michael M. Grynbaum, Trump Calls Media the “Enemy of the American People,” 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2017, at A15. 
8 President Trump is hardly the first in that office to take on the press. John Adams 
supported the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, in part to silence his press critics. Jefferson, 
an ardent defender of a free press, nonetheless thought “[n]ewspapers present for the most 
part only a caricature of disaffected minds.” Franklin Roosevelt assigned certain reporters 
to his “dunce club” and used fireside chats to speak to the people directly. Nixon and his 
vice president, Spiro Agnew, popularized the notion of journalists as effete, liberal, 
intellectual snobs. See A History of the Presidency – Presidents and the Press, PROFILES 
OF U.S. PRESIDENTS, http://www.presidentprofiles.com/General-Information/A-History     
-of-the-Presidency-Presidents-and-the-press.html#ixzz4WEzNxRnh (last visited Sept. 29, 
2017). 
9 In this paper, I use the terms “press” and “media” interchangeably, though I do think 
the former word calls up a more positive image. But cf. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO 
AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2 (“What’s in a name? . . . [A] rose by any other word would smell 
as sweet . . . .”). 
10 “[A] First Amendment bubble of protection for media is in the process of bursting 
because of courts’ privacy concerns, and the sometimes appalling decisions by push-the-
envelope publishers that then attempt to cloak themselves with the Constitution.” Amy 
Gajda, The Present of Newsworthiness, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 145, 147 (2016). 
11 Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 
2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low 
.aspx; see also Views of the News Media: 1985–2011, Press Widely Criticized, But Trusted 
More Than Other Information Sources, THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. 6 (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/9-22-2011%20Media%20Attitudes%20 
Release.pdf (percentage of those who find the press to be “immoral” is at an all-time high). 
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found Rolling Stone Magazine liable for maliciously defaming an 
associate dean of students at the University of Virginia in a false 
article about an alleged gang rape on campus.12 In 2016, a Florida 
jury awarded Terry Bollea, the former professional wrestler known as 
Hulk Hogan, $115 million in compensatory damages and $25 million 
in punitive damages in an invasion of privacy suit against the Gawker 
website for posting a sex tape of him.13 The tape truthfully depicted 
the events. However, while truth is a defense in a libel case, it is not 
in a privacy lawsuit. The lawsuit effectively put Gawker out of 
business.14 
I do not offer these cherry-picked anecdotes as empirical evidence 
of a trend or shift in the outcome of libel and invasion of privacy 
cases against the press.15 What these cases suggest is that issues at the 
core of the Constitution’s Free Speech and Free Press Clauses are 
surprisingly unsettled.16 In Parts I, II, and III, I consider the 
difficulties in identifying the limits of the public figure category, once 
the courts agreed to assign that fictional identity to more than just 
celebrities. In Part IV, I concentrate on invasion of privacy torts and 
the confusion over the bounds of “newsworthiness” and whether truth 
is always a defense. In Part V, I question the ease with which the New 
York Times rule migrated from covering the official acts of public 
officials to reporting on their private behavior. 
 
12 Ben Sisario, Hawes Spencer & Sydney Ember, Magazine Loses Suit Charging 
Defamation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2016, at B1; see infra Part II for a detailed discussion of 
this case. 
13 Nick Madigan & Ravi Somaiya, Hefty Damages to Hulk Hogan in Gawker Suit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2016, at A1; see also infra Part IV, Section A. 
14 Sydney Ember, In Bankruptcy, Gawker Offers Itself for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2016, at A1. 
15 Despite the protections of Sullivan, a 2004 report found that libel awards against 
media defendants were still high. See Benjamin Barron, A Proposal to Rescue New York 
Times v. Sullivan by Promoting a Responsible Press, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 73, 74 (2004) 
(citing MEDIA LAW RESEARCH CTR., MLRC 2004 REPORT ON TRIALS AND DAMAGES, 
BULLETIN 28, tbl.8 (Feb. 2004)). 
16 For an in-depth study of the relatively minor role played by the Free Press Clause, 
independently of the Free Speech Clause, see David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 
80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002). In Sullivan, the Court relied on the Free Speech Clause and in 
no way limited its new protections against libel laws to journalists. N. Y. Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). For the view that the Free Press Clause 
independently grants special protections to the news media, see Justice Potter Stewart, Or 
of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). For the contrary view, see Anthony Lewis, A 
Preferred Place for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979). 
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I 
GO FIGURE! PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 
In 1964, no less a constitutional scholar than Harry Kalven, Jr. 
suggested that the Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times v. 
Sullivan “may prove to be the best and most important . . . ever 
produced in the realm of freedom of speech.”17 A generation later, the 
dean of legal journalists, Anthony Lewis, thought that Sullivan had 
delivered on its promise, giving the First Amendment’s “bold words 
their full meaning.”18 Without the change in libel law wrought by 
Sullivan, Lewis thought it doubtful that “the press could have done as 
much as it has to penetrate the power and secrecy of modern 
government, or to confront the public with the realities of policy 
issues.”19 
For Lewis, as for Kalven, the Sullivan opinion correctly crafted a 
constitutional hierarchy of free speech values, placing at the apex the 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may 
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks on government and public officials.”20 The italicizations of 
“public” in this quotation are added by the author of this article, but 
the logic of Sullivan demands prioritizing the important constitutional 
role a free press plays as a watchdog on government over the less 
important press coverage of private persons. The decision singles out 
one kind of press coverage—that of the public conduct of public 
officials—as of paramount democratic value. 
The problem with then-existing libel laws, the justices ruled, was 
that they created a “chilling factor” that could deter the press from 
equipping citizens to scrutinize public officials.21 Any misstatement 
 
17 Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on the “Central Meaning of 
the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 194 (1964). Similarly, Alexander 
Meiklejohn considered the decision “an occasion for dancing in the streets.” Id. at 221 
n.125. 
18 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 234 (1991). 
19 Id. at 245. Not everyone celebrates Sullivan’s contributions to a free press and 
democratic self-government. Cass Sunstein thought Sullivan had a “dark side” in harming 
public civility. Cass R. Sunstein, Libel Protection’s Troubling Dark Side, THE MORNING 
CALL (Mar. 25, 2014), http://articles.mcall.com/2014-03-25/opinion/mc-libel-times-v         
-sullvian-web-20140325_1_sunstein-u-s-supreme-court-new-york-times. Benjamin Barron 
thought the decision encouraged an irresponsible press by removing incentives to report 
stories accurately. Barron, supra note 15, at 73. 
20 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added). 
21 Id. at 271–72. 
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of fact, even if made in a good faith effort to report the truth, 
subjected the press to paying large defamation awards, not just for 
actual damage to reputation, but for presumed and punitive damages 
as well.22 To be sure, there is no constitutional value in false and 
defamatory press statements per se.23 Nevertheless, the Court 
concluded that the pursuit of truth required cutting the press broad 
constitutional slack. Henceforth, libel plaintiffs would bear the burden 
of proving not only that the press had published a falsehood, but also 
that it did so with “actual malice,” meaning that the press published 
the statement knowing it was false or in reckless disregard of whether 
it was true or false.24 
The Sullivan decision was unanimous. Interestingly, however, two 
justices added a concurrence to distinguish between press criticisms 
of the official conduct of public officials—the scenario presented in 
Sullivan—and press criticism of the private conduct of public 
officials. They preferred to limit the Sullivan holding to the former.25 
However, Sullivan proved a difficult decision to compartmentalize. 
Rather quickly, two pillars of the decision—the distinction between 
covering official acts as opposed to the private conduct of public 
officials26 and the clean distinction between public officials and 
everyone else—collapsed.27 This collapse changed the nature of news 
in ways that now underscore the backlash against the press we are 
currently witnessing. 
A. From Public Official to Public Figure 
Within two years of Sullivan, the Court confronted the problem of 
persons who were not “of” government but who were very much “in” 
 
22 Id. at 267. 
23 Id. at 279 n.19. 
24 Id. at 279–80. 
25 Id. at 301–02 (Douglas & Goldberg, JJ., concurring). The majority opinion expressly 
reserved this question. Id. at 283 n.23. 
26 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (“The New York Times rule 
is not rendered inapplicable merely because an official’s private reputation, as well as his 
public reputation, is harmed.”); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 (1971) 
(“Given the realities of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements 
about a candidate might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he 
seeks.”). Courts have gone so far as to find the public has a legitimate interest in knowing 
about the private behavior of a candidate’s minor children. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 
P.2d 912, 915–16 (Cal. 1969). 
27 See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
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the news, and justifiably so.28 For the same reason that the press 
needs breathing room to investigate heads of state, the press deserves 
space to investigate and criticize the heads of corporations,29 head 
football coaches suspected of fixing games,30 or retired generals 
leading marches against integration.31 
Regarding public figures such as these, the Court underscored four 
reasons why libel laws should treat press coverage the same way 
Sullivan treated libel cases brought by public officials. First, public 
figures are like public officials in that they exercise power over 
important events and institutions.32 Second, public figures, like public 
officials, in some sense volunteer for heightened media attention 
when they choose to occupy positions of power and interest to the 
general public.33 Third, public figures, like government officials, 
command sufficient media attention to rebut any libelous story.34 And 
fourth, the actions of public figures are generally as newsworthy, if 
not more so, than those of any government officials, save the 
highest.35 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the First 
Amendment’s free speech guarantees in libel cases must be the same 
for public figures and public officials.36 
At one point, three judges on the Court joined in a plurality opinion 
balking at the public figure doctrine. They argued for changing the 
focus from the identity of the person bringing a libel lawsuit to the 
subject matter of the story. So long as the story is a matter of 
legitimate public interest, these justices argued, it cannot be less 
legitimate simply because it covers a private person.37 However, a 
 
28 Arthur B. Hanson, Developments in the Law of Libel: Impact of the New York Times 
Rule, 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 215, 217–23 (1966). 
29 See, e.g., Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 766, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (covering 
nepotism charges against head of a major oil company). 
30 Curtis, 388 U.S. at 135. 
31 Id. at 140. 
32 Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“[I]t is plain that although they are not subject 
to the constraints of the political process, ‘public figures,’ like ‘public officials,’ often play 
an influential role in ordering society.”). 
33 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
34 Id. at 344 (“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using 
available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its 
adverse impact on reputation.”). 
35 Curtis, 388 U.S. at 147–48. 
36 Id. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“differentiation between ‘public figures’ and 
‘public officials’ . . . [has] no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy”); see also 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 691 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1982). 
37 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31–32 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion). 
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majority of the Court never adopted this test. The majority saw a need 
to give private persons more protection in libel suits than public 
officials or figures needed, given the greater ability public persons 
have to get their side of the story out.38 
But just who is a public figure?39 Steven Shiffrin speculates that 
courts would find it easier to consider a celebrity chef like Wolfgang 
Puck a public figure for all purposes than it would be for them to 
assume that the chairman of General Motors, currently Mary Barra, is 
necessarily a public figure.40 This makes no democratic sense, 
Shiffrin rightly concludes, since the head of GM has far more power 
over American policy than even the most famous celebrity chef.41 
B. From Public Figure to Limited Public Figure 
Courts solved half of the Shiffrin hypothetical by inventing the 
category of limited public figures. As opposed to full-bodied public 
figures who achieve that status by virtue of “pervasive fame or 
notoriety,”42 some persons move in and out of the media spotlight 
depending on the story. “Limited” public figures are persons who 
were private persons until they somehow “volunteered” to involve 
themselves in a matter of public importance.43 By virtue of injecting 
themselves into a public controversy, limited public figures must live 
by Sullivan’s libel rules, until such time as they migrate back to their 
private lives. 
The constraints of the limited public figure category are far from 
clear. On the one hand, a lawyer who voluntarily takes on a 
newsworthy case about alleged police misconduct does not forfeit his 
status as a private person.44 On the other hand, an otherwise unknown 
 
38 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344–46. 
39 Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (“Defining 
public figures is much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall.”). 
40 Steven Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation, and First Amendment 
Methodology, 97 VA. L. REV. 559, 564 (2011). 
41 Id. 
42 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. For instance, George Clooney’s fame makes him a public 
figure in everything he does. 
43 Id. at 345. Gertz also recognized at least the hypothetical existence of “involuntary 
public figures” who by circumstance and not choice become important for the media to 
cover in relation to a public controversy. Id. A 2004 review found only some nineteen 
cases dealing with involuntary public figures. Christopher Russell Smith, Note, Dragged 
into the Vortex: Reclaiming Private Plaintiffs’ Interests in Limited Purpose Public Figure 
Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1429 (2004). 
44 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. Despite dicta in Gertz that courts are reluctant to treat 
lawyers as public figures, courts have done so where events underlying a murder trial had 
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associate dean of students does forfeit her status once she becomes 
the focal point of a news story about a university’s response to a 
student’s allegation of rape on campus.45 
While still a law professor, Justice Elena Kagan raised doubts 
about the boundaries of the public figure doctrine. Without answering 
the question, Kagan asked whether the public figure doctrine was 
working to extend Sullivan from press coverage of “truly powerful 
people” to instances of “press arrogance” in damaging the reputations 
of persons powerless to respond.46 
II 
THE ROLLING STONE LIBEL CASE AND THE LIMITLESS PUBLIC FIGURE 
CATEGORY 
In seeking an answer to Justice Kagan’s query, I turn to a detailed 
study of a well-known recent defamation case.47 On November 19, 
2014, Rolling Stone published an article detailing a University of 
Virginia (UVA) student’s account of her alleged gang rape at a 
college fraternity house.48 The story portrayed Nicole Eramo, an 
associate dean, as dismissive of the student’s allegations as they 
wound their way through university procedures for investigating such 
complaints.49 The online version of the article, on the magazine’s 
website, was viewed more than 2.7 million times.50 The author of the 
article, Sabrina Rubin Erdely, made numerous appearances on other 
media outlets, repeating the substance of the article.51 
Rolling Stone was an unlikely candidate to serve as a poster boy for 
irresponsible journalism. The magazine has a long tradition of 
 
a “devastating effect on the [local] economy.” Ratner v. Young, 465 F. Supp. 386, 400 
(V.I. 1979). 
45 See infra Part II. 
46 Elena Kagan, A Libel Story: Sullivan Then and Now, 18 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 197, 
206 (1993). 
47 Sisario, Spencer & Ember, supra note 12, at B1. 
48 Sabrina Rubin Erdely, A Rape on Campus: The Brutal Assault and Struggle for 
Justice at UVA, ROLLING STONE, Nov. 19, 2014. 
49 The first paragraph of the article read: “Jackie was just starting her freshman year at 
the University of Virginia when she was brutally assaulted by seven men at a frat party. 
When she tried to hold them accountable, a whole new kind of abuse began.” Id.; see also 
Eramo vs. Rolling Stone Complaint, WASH. POST ¶ 55, https://www.washing tonpost.com 
/apps/g/page/local/eramo-vs-rolling-stone-complaint/1692 (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). 
50 Eramo vs. Rolling Stone Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 1. 
51 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 868 (W.D. Va. 2016), modified 
in part by Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-00023, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
141423 (W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2016). 
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publishing important pieces of investigative journalism. For instance, 
the magazine is known for reporting on the abduction of Patti Hearst, 
the war in Afghanistan, home foreclosures in Florida, banking 
scandals, and the Boston Marathon terrorists. Contributors over the 
magazine’s fifty-year history include journalistic pioneers, such as 
Tom Wolfe and Hunter S. Thompson.52 
In this instance, however, The Washington Post and other media 
organizations cast doubt on key factual allegations in the Rolling 
Stone article.53 After interviewing the alleged rape victim and 
investigating her claims, the Charlottesville police department issued 
a report stating that the victim told the police a different story than the 
one she told Rolling Stone. Essentially, there was “no substantive 
basis of fact to conclude that an incident occurred that is consistent 
with the facts described in the November 19, 2014, Rolling Stone 
Magazine article.”54 
Acknowledging that it placed too much trust in the victim’s own 
account, Rolling Stone asked the Dean of the Columbia School of 
Journalism to undertake a review.55 The review faulted Rolling Stone 
reporters and editors for failing to verify information and ignoring 
leads that suggested the unreliability of the alleged victim’s 
 
52 Rolling Stone, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolling_Stone (last updated 
Aug. 18, 2017); see also HUNTER S. THOMPSON, THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF HUNTER S. 
THOMPSON: FEAR AND LOATHING AT ROLLING STONE (Jann S. Wenner ed., 2011). In 
September of 2017, the owners of Rolling Stone announced that they were putting the 
magazine up for sale. Sydney Ember, An Era’s End, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2017, at B1. 
53 For instance, no party took place at the fraternity on the night that the victim claimed 
she was sexually assaulted there. See T. Rees Shapiro, Key Elements of Rolling Stone’s U-




54 Eramo vs. Rolling Stone Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 125. 
55 Sheila Coronel, Steve Coll & Derek Kravitz, Rolling Stone and UVA: The Columbia 
University Graduate School of Journalism Report, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 5, 2015), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/a-rape-on-campus-what-went-wrong-20150 
405 [hereinafter CJR]. 
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account.56 After this report, Rolling Stone retracted the original article 
and removed it from the website.57 
Eramo, the UVA dean, then sued Rolling Stone for defamation. 
Dean Eramo charged that falsehoods about her in the article 
were not the result of an innocent mistake [but] . . . were the result 
of a wanton journalist who was more concerned with writing an 
article that fulfilled her preconceived narrative about the 
victimization of women on American college campuses, and a 
malicious publisher who was more concerned about selling 
magazines to boost the economic bottom line for its faltering 
magazine, than they were about discovering the truth or actual 
facts.58 
This was the rare case where Dean Eramo could have been 
considered a public official as an administrator at a public 
university,59 a public figure involved in a matter of public concern, or 
a private person simply doing her job. Classifying Dean Eramo as a 
public official would have had the disadvantage of making the status 
of a college dean depend on the accidental factor of whether she 
worked at a private or public university.60 At any rate, because the 
trial judge decided that she was a public figure he never reached the 
issue of whether the dean was a public official.61 Since public figures 
and public officials are treated alike for libel cases, there was no need 
to consider her governmental status. 
 
56 The CJR found that Rolling Stone relied almost exclusively on the word of the 
alleged victim, without independently corroborating key facts such as the name, identity or 
even the existence of the supposed gang rape leader, the occurrence of any party at the 
fraternity on the night the assaults allegedly took place, the account the victim gave of 
telling her friends about the assaults, or the account the victim gave of her meetings with 
Dean Eramo. Id. The report gives the sense of a reporter and magazine in a rush to get the 
story out and overly fearful that probing the victim might cause her to stop cooperating. Id. 
57 A Note to Our Readers, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.rollingstone 
.com/culture/news/a-note-to-our-readers-20141205. 
58 Eramo vs. Rolling Stone Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 9. 
59 See Grossman v. Smart, 807 F. Supp. 1404, 1408 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (classifying public 
university professors as public officials). 
60 The Sullivan decision expressly reserved decision on the applicability of the “actual 
malice” standard to libel cases brought by low-level public officials. See N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964); see also LEWIS, supra note 18, at 172. But cf. 
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 527 (1991) 
(“police officers are almost invariably classified as public officials, no matter how low 
their rank”); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 
UTAH L. REV. 951, 979–80 nn.243–44 (2014) (citing to cases classifying public teachers 
as public figures). 
61 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 869–71 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
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Before Rolling Stone published its article, Dean Eramo was hardly 
a subject of news interest. To be clear, as the University’s point 
person on student sexual assault, her work touched on matters of 
public concern, and she did occasionally give interviews to the 
campus newspaper and other local media outlets. But it takes the 
limits out of “limited” public figure doctrine if such sparse and 
infrequent comments, done in the course of her employment, are 
sufficient to turn the dean into a person actively seeking to inject 
herself into the news. Then how does a Rolling Stone reporter’s 
decision to focus on the dean’s alleged failings as a campus sexual 
assault officer change her into a public figure? 
In finding that Dean Eramo was a limited public figure, the judge 
provided five lines of reasoning.62 First, the magazine story 
undoubted dealt with a public controversy, namely UVA’s response 
to allegations of campus sexual assault.63 Second, this controversy 
existed prior to the publication of the article. In fact, the Office of 
Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education was investigating 
the University’s sexual assault complaint procedures, as it was at 
other universities.64 Third, prior to the article, Dean Eramo 
“voluntarily assumed a position of ‘special prominence’ on this issue: 
she took advantage of her access to local media, specifically by 
appearing on WUVA, providing input to The Cavalier Daily, and 
speaking to local affiliates of national news networks.”65 Fourth, 
Dean Eramo remained a public figure at the time Rolling Stone 
published its story.66 Fifth, after the story broke, Dean Eramo 
voluntarily sought to attract press attention to her efforts to restore her 
reputation.67 
In holding Dean Eramo to be a limited public figure, the judge set 
aside one crucial fact that should have been the issue. UVA 
 
62 Id. The judge followed a framework laid out in Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
37 F.3d 1541, 1553 (4th Cir. 1994). 
63 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 870; see also CJR, supra note 55 (“‘A Rape on Campus’ 
had ambitions beyond recounting one woman’s assault. It was intended as an investigation 
of how colleges deal with sexual violence. The assignment was timely. The systems 
colleges have put in place to deal with sexual misconduct have come under intense 
scrutiny.”); cf. Roffman v. Trump, 754 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (defendant Donald 
Trump’s criticisms of the plaintiff’s competency as an investment analyst went to a purely 
private controversy between the two persons). 
64 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 870. See generally CJR, supra note 55. 
65 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 870. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 871. 
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specifically prohibited Dean Eramo from talking to the reporter 
writing the Rolling Stone story, preferring that the university president 
be the “public official/figure” representing the university’s position.68 
It seems churlish to say that Dean Eramo had effective channels of 
communication to protect her reputation when she could not tell her 
side of the story to the Rolling Stone reporter, whose article reached a 
national audience in the millions.69 Far from volunteering to inject 
herself into the Rolling Stone story, the dean was prevented from 
doing so. She was caught between a rock and a hard place. On the one 
hand, the terms of her employment required her not to talk to the 
media in order to protect the privacy rights of students. On the other 
hand, the terms of libel law treated her as if she were free to protect 
her reputation by “self-helping” to media attention anytime she 
wanted. 
Once the judge labeled Dean Eramo a limited public figure, he 
treated her efforts to respond to the published article as evidence that 
she met the test for volunteering to be the subject of media 
attention.70 But how is it voluntary when the necessity of defending 
her reputation was thrust upon her by the defamatory account Rolling 
Stone chose to publish? It seems a clear case of having one’s hand 
forced. 
Since the beginning of the public figure doctrine, the Supreme 
Court has stressed that “those charged with defamation cannot, by 
their own conduct, create their own defense by making the claimant a 
public figure.”71 Lower courts have frequently found that the mere 
fact that a private person publicly responds to a media attack is not 
enough to turn that person into a public figure.72 As one court put it: 
“too easy a finding that someone has become a public figure by virtue 
 
68 The university cited student privacy rights as the reason it would be best to prohibit 
the dean who had talked to students about sexual assault from talking to the magazine. Id. 
at 870–71; see also CJR, supra note 55. 
69 See Eramo vs. Rolling Stone Complaint, supra note 49, ¶ 1. 
70 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 871 (limited public figure status “bec[ame] even more 
apparent” when Eramo gave an interview to the Columbia Journalism Review after the 
publication of the original article). 
71 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). 
72 E.g., Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1107 (Colo. 1982) 
(en banc) (citing DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980) (fired police officer does 
not become public figure merely by going to the media to defend his reputation)); Franklin 
v. Lodge 1108, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 159 Cal. Rptr. 131, 141 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1979) (public school teacher does not become a public figure in relation to a 
textbook controversy simply because she responded to press inquiries as required by the 
school district). 
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of responding to unfavorable publicity can have a chilling effect on 
the expression of a private figure.”73 Here is a clear instance of the 
damage done by overextending the New York Times rule—
participation in speech is lessened rather than increased when private 
persons lose important legal protections simply by speaking out. 
Rolling Stone was able to play offense, while Dean Eramo was not 
allowed to put up the kind of defense available to private persons.74 
Unfortunately, the judge’s decision in the Rolling Stone case was in 
line with other court decisions stretching the limits of the limited 
public figure doctrine. Among persons classified as limited public 
persons, despite little volunteering, are: a farmer swept up into a 
public controversy over pollution in a nearby lake, with the judge 
dismissing as “irrelevant” the question of the farmer’s “desire—or 
lack of desire—to draw attention to himself”;75 a man falsely reported 
on television news as committing a violent crime;76 a lawyer falsely 
reported as having been found guilty on drug charges, since, in 
addition to representing the motorcycle gang indicted for drug 
trafficking, he had socialized with them on weekend trips and the 
like;77 and a businessman who won a contract to build a controversial 
new water system for a township.78 
At best, treating persons as limited public figures rests on a 
plausible application of familiar principles of “assumption of the 
risk”—If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen.79 However, 
unlike celebrity public figures, limited public figures rarely possess 
the equity built into assumption of risk.80 Persons such as Dean 
Eramo could hardly have known of the risk of defamatory national 
 
73 Diversified Mgmt., 653 P.2d at 1107. 
74 See supra text accompanying notes 68 and 69 for restrictions that hampered Dean 
Eramo’s ability to defend her reputation. 
75 See Nat Stern, Unresolved Antitheses of the Limited Public Figure Doctrine, 33 
HOUS. L. REV. 1027, 1071 n.333 (1996) (citing to Wiegel v. Capital Times Co., 426 
N.W.2d 43, 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988)). 
76 Erdmann v. SF Broad. of Green Bay, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). 
77 Stern, supra note 75, at 1073 (citing Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 
754 F.2d 1072, 1085–86 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
78 Weinel v. Monken, 481 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
79 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (“[P]ublic figures have 
voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood        
. . . .”). 
80 The notion here is that individuals are less morally deserving of protection from 
press coverage when they knowingly seek out public prominence. Id. at 344 (referring to 
“a compelling normative consideration underlying the distinction between public and 
private defamation plaintiffs”). 
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media attention when taking a job dealing with campus sexual assault 
and meeting with students bringing such allegations. The Supreme 
Court has stressed that mere involvement in a public controversy is a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for becoming a public 
figure.81 
In the end, the legal burden of being a limited public figure did not 
keep Dean Eramo from winning her libel suit.82 Once the judge 
determined that the plaintiff was a limited public figure, he had to 
next determine whether there was sufficient evidence of “actual 
malice” to let the case go to a jury or whether he should grant Rolling 
Stone’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that no 
reasonable jury could find actual malice.83 Frequently, a finding of 
public figure status is conclusive of the case, since the actual malice 
burden is hard to carry.84 Indeed, this is one of the key protections 
that the public figure doctrine gives to media defendants—the ability 
to eliminate cases through summary judgment.85 However, here the 
judge permitted the case to go to jury trial,86 and the jurors found the 
article to be egregious enough for Dean Eramo to meet the bar for 
“actual malice” burden of proof so often described as 
“insurmountable.”87 
The jury did not specify its reasons for finding Rolling Stone liable. 
However, the judge instructed the jury that it could find actual malice 
only if it believed evidence that the magazine had serious doubts 
about the truth of its story and yet failed to investigate and instead 
published a story in reckless disregard of whether or not it was true.88 
 
81 Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979). 
82 Sisario, Spencer & Ember, supra note 12, at B1. The jury awarded Eramo $3 million 
in damages. T. Rees Shapiro, Jury Awards $3 Million in Damages to U-Va. Dean for 
Rolling Stone Defamation, WASH. POST: BLOG (Nov. 7, 2016, 10:48 PM), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/local/education/jury-to-deliberate-damages-to-u-va-dean-in-rolling    
-stone-defamation-lawsuit/2016/11/07/e2aa2eb0-a506-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story 
.html. Subsequently, Eramo reached a confidential settlement with Rolling Stone. Matthew 
Haag, Rolling Stone Settles Libel Suit Over 2014 Campus Rape Article, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
12, 2017, at B3. 
83 Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 209 F. Supp. 3d 862, 871–75 (W.D. Va. 2016). 
84 See Susan M. Gilles, Public Plaintiffs and Private Facts: Should the “Public Figure” 
Doctrine Be Transplanted into Privacy Law?, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1204, 1208 n.25 (2005) 
(citing to study showing that “just over eighty percent of defense motions for summary 
judgment” were granted due to “lack of evidence of actual malice”). 
85 See id. at 1208. 
86 Eramo, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 875. 
87 Stern, supra note 75, at 1028. 
88 Lizzie Crocker, This is What the Jury in the Rolling Stone Defamation Trial Must 
Decide, THE DAILY BEAST (Nov. 2, 2016, 8:05 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com 
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Some of that evidence came via the highly critical review of the 
magazine’s decision making from the Columbia Journalism School 
that Rolling Stone itself had solicited.89 The evidence certainly 
justified the jury’s conclusion that the reporter started with a 
preconceived and sensational story line that needed a villain and she 
deliberately ignored any leads that would contradict her narrative.90 
What if the jury had decided differently and accepted Rolling 
Stone’s defense that, while it made mistakes, it acted in good faith to 
report an important story? Had the jurors thought along these lines, 
they would have been bound to rule against Dean Eramo as a limited 
public figure who had to put up with defamatory stories that were 
negligently, but not maliciously, published. Here again is where an 
overextension of the New York Times rule occurs. The likes of a Dean 
Eramo are far removed from the powerful persons the Sullivan ruling 
had in mind when granting the press new protections in libel cases. 
While it makes good sense to expand the New York Times rule to 
some public figures, surely the decision is not so elastic as to impose 
defamation costs on a minor figure such as an associate college dean. 
My guess is if one had searched the web for mention of Dean 
Eramo’s name the day before the Rolling Stone story broke, the 
results would have been small and locally confined to Charlottesville 
media. The fact that searching Dean Eramo’s name after publication 
retrieves thousands of sites nationally should not stand as evidence 
that she is a public figure.91 
 
/articles/2016/11/02/this-is-what-the-jury-in-the-rolling-stone-defamation-trial-must           
-decide.html. 
89 The judge denied Rolling Stone’s pretrial motion to keep the CJR from the jury. 
Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, No. 3:15-CV-00023, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142185, at *2 
(W.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2016). 
90 Although the jurors did not disclose their reasoning, the trial judge denied Rolling 
Stone’s pretrial motion for summary judgment partly because he viewed the likely 
evidence as strong enough to support a jury conclusion that the reporter had massaged the 
facts to fit her preconceived ill-will toward university administrators. See Eramo, 209 F. 
Supp. 3d at 872; see also George Packer, Rolling Stone and the Temptations of Narrative 
Journalism, NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily              
-comment/rolling-stone-and-the-temptations-of-narrative-journalism (reporter “never 
allowed herself to sustain any doubts” once she “found what she was looking for”). 
91 On February 7, 2017, a Google search of “Nicole Eramo” retrieved 133,000 
references, while “Nicole Eramo UVA” retrieved 18,800. 
ABRAMSON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/2017  8:12 AM 
2017] Full Court Press: Drawing in Media Defenses for Libel and Privacy Cases 35 
III 
LIMITS TO LIMITED PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE 
In a different cultural climate, I might propose eliminating the 
“limited” option within the public figure doctrine entirely, forcing an 
all or nothing choice. Mindful of recent attacks on the press,92 I 
venture in this paper to suggest a more modest reform. Courts should 
put teeth into the existing requirement that private persons morph into 
public figures only to the extent that they meaningfully volunteer to 
attract the media limelight.93 In Gertz, the Court correctly 
distinguished a lawyer’s consent to take on a controversial case from 
the lawyer’s consent to make himself the story.94 The same is true for 
Dean Eramo. Her choice to respond to a defamatory account cannot 
count as after-the-fact ratification of the initial media story she did not 
seek.95 
A 1976 Supreme Court decision provides a model for how to rein 
in the “voluntary” prong of the limited public figure doctrine.96 In 
covering divorce proceedings between socialites Mary and Russell 
Firestone, Time Magazine falsely reported that the grounds for 
granting the husband a divorce was his wife’s adultery.97 The Court 
held that divorce proceedings were not a “public controversy” to 
which the New York Times rule applied.98 Moreover, Mary Firestone 
did not become a limited public figure in relation to the divorce by 
 
92 See supra notes 6–7; see also Jim Rutenberg, Celebrating Independence as Free 
Press is Besieged, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2017, at B1. 
93 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974); see also Wolston v. Reader’s 
Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157, 167–68 (1979) (emphasizing that the newsworthiness of 
investigations into alleged Soviet espionage in the United States did not automatically 
convert plaintiff into a limited public figure, but courts must still consider whether he 
voluntarily thrust himself into media attention regarding this controversy). However, since 
Gertz, many courts have reasoned that a sufficiently important public controversy can 
“displace any real consideration of plaintiffs’ voluntary participation . . . .” Smith, supra 
note 43, at 1440; see also Stern, supra note 75, at 1038 (noting that the original “stringent” 
requirement of voluntary action has given way to competing views). 
94 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352. 
95 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979); Foretich v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 37 F.3d 1541, 1558 (4th Cir. 1994) (while finding grandparents accused 
of child abuse to be limited public figures, agreeing that merely responding reasonably and 
proportionately to a defamatory story is not enough to change private persons into limited 
public figures). 
96 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 (1976). 
97 Id. at 466–67 (Powell, J., concurring). 
98 Id. at 454. 
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merely holding “several press conferences.”99 While it was true that 
she chose to answer reporters’ questions, the Court did not think those 
responses amounted to “thrusting” herself into the media coverage of 
the divorce proceedings in a way that turned the domestic controversy 
public.100 
Compare the Firestone opinion with the 2002 case where a 
Catholic priest, accused of child abuse, responded to the allegations 
by holding a single press conference. That was enough, a California 
court ruled, to make him a limited public figure.101 But how is a 
person to defend his or her reputation without responding to bad 
press? And why should responding to attacks on your reputation raise 
the bar on winning a defamation case in court?102 To be clear, the 
growing issue of sexual abuse in the priesthood was and still is a 
matter of vital public concern that the press should cover. However, 
unless the Court wishes to resurrect the never-adopted opinion in 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, extending the New York Times rule to all 
newsworthy stories, then the mere allegation that any particular 
unknown priest is a child abuser is not enough to make the person a 
public figure. 
Jury verdicts often serve the important purpose of bringing 
community norms to bear on the application of the law in particular 
cases.103 The Rolling Stone jury verdict provided early warning of a 
souring public attitude about the media.104 I turn in the next Part to 
consider the public attitude when it comes to balancing the value of 
publicity versus the norms of privacy. 
 
99 Id. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nor did simply marrying a wealthy heir make 
Mary Firestone a general public figure. Id. at 453. 
100 Id. at 453. 
101 Smith, supra note 43, at 1420 n.2 (citing Baird v. Haigh, No. CGC-02-413508, 2003 
Cal. Super. LEXIS 5034 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2003)). 
102 Id. at 1419 (citing Dana Parsons, Accused Priest Learns the Court Works in 
Mysterious Ways, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2002, at B3). 
103 See, e.g., Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (“[W]hether a publication is or is not newsworthy depends upon contemporary 
community mores and standards of decency. . . . This is largely a question of fact, which a 
jury is uniquely well-suited to decide.”). For a general defense of the jury as an instrument 
of local democracy, see JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE 
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY (2000). 
104 See Sisario, Spencer & Ember, supra note 12, at B1 (speculating that “the public’s 
disillusionment with the news media and its transgressions and faults seemed to be a 
factor.”). 
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IV 
PRIVACY, TRUTH, AND NEWSWORTHINESS 
Unlike libel, invasion of privacy may occur even if the offending 
story is true.105 The personal injury is not to one’s reputation but to 
one’s right, under many state laws, to seclude intimate personal 
details from disclosure.106 The publicity is the injury. Thus, it is often 
said that rape is one injury, while the disclosure of the victim’s name 
is another, especially when the victim has sought to shelter her 
identity.107 The same is true for the injury suffered by family or 
friends as a result of the online posting of photographs of the 
decapitated body of a daughter,108 or of a toddler who died due to 
severe head trauma,109 or of a racecar driver killed in a wreck, or of a 
trainer killed at SeaWorld.110 
Many courts and commentators question whether privacy torts are 
reconcilable with the First Amendment.111 The unresolved question is 
whether truth is always a defense in such cases.112 Moreover, once a 
state recognizes invasion of privacy as a tort, the law has to take on 
the unenviable task of deciding, either as a matter of law or matter of 
fact, whether a given story is a matter of “legitimate public concern” 
or is privacy-invading.113 For example, consider the case of Oliver W. 
 
105 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
106 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630–638 (2016); see also LaHodny v. 48 Hours, 
No. 6:13-cv-2102-TC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38447, at *9 (D. Or. 2015) (quoting Mauri 
v. Smith, 929 P.2d 307, 310 (Or. 1996)). 
107 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471–74 (1975); see also Doe v. Sarasota-
Bradenton Fla. Television Co., 436 So. 2d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (rape victim sued 
television station for broadcasting her image and name, despite prosecutor’s assurance that 
her identity would be kept private when she testified at trial). 
108 See Jeffrey Abramson, Searching for Reputation: Reconciling Free Speech and the 
“Right to be Forgotten,” 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 51 (2015). 
109 Marsh v. Cty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1152–53 (9th Cir. 2012). 
110 Clay Calvert, Protecting the Public from Itself: Paternalism and Irony in Defining 
Newsworthiness, 50 NEW ENG. L. REV. 165, 181 (2016). 
111 See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (“First 
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for 
the publication of newsworthy facts. . . .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D 
(AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court has yet to resolve whether 
truth is a defense to the tort of publicity given to private life). 
112 See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 479 (Cal. 1998) (noting 
the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court). 
113 Id. (“It is in the determination of newsworthiness . . . that courts must struggle . . .”); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652D(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (stating 
plaintiff must prove that the story was “not of legitimate concern to the public”); SPJ Code 
of Ethics, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS (1996), http://www.spj.org 
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Sipple.114 In 1975, Sipple struck the arm of a woman aiming a gun at 
President Gerald Ford, arguably saving the President’s life.115 In 
subsequent media coverage, some reporters took note of the fact that 
Sipple was a gay man.116 Sipple sued for public disclosure of private 
facts. Among the reasons the court gave for upholding a summary 
judgment against Sipple was the newsworthiness of a story that 
rebutted “the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak and 
unheroic figures.”117 Also, the story raised questions about whether 
President Ford had delayed publicly thanking Sipple due to Sipple’s 
sexual orientation.118 For these reasons, a private matter became a 
matter of legitimate public concern. 
In the decade after Sullivan, the Supreme Court took the position 
that a “responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press 
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other 
virtues it cannot be legislated.”119 Faced with the troubling cases 
where truthful news arguably invaded a person’s privacy, the Court 
found ways to deflect the issue.120 
A. Hulk Hogan Wrestles Gawker 
Now, avoiding the issue is harder than ever. The website, Gawker, 
gleefully took on the mission of extending the boundaries of the news 
beyond traditional restraints.121 The name defined the goal—to peer 
at, peak into, and expose. Gawker’s creators thought that the more 
 
/pdf/ehticscode.pdf (stating cautiously that “an overriding public need can justify intrusion 
into anyone’s privacy.”). 
114 Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1984). 
115 Id. at 666. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 670. 
118 Id. 
119 Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (striking down a 
Florida law requiring newspapers to give candidates for public office a “right of reply” to 
editorials opposing them). 
120 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471–74 (1975) (concluding there 
was no invasion of privacy in printing rape victim’s name, since reporter found it in a 
court public record); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532–34 (1989) (concluding that the 
newspaper lawfully obtained the name of sex offense victim from a public police record); 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 521 (2001) (concluding that the original wiretap may 
have been unlawful, but the radio station obtained its information lawfully). 
121 See, e.g., Madigan & Somaiya, supra note 13, at A1 (noting Gawker’s “insistence 
that nearly any topic is fair game”). 
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private an event was, the greater the public’s curiosity. Gawker’s job 
was to satisfy that curiosity, not judge it.122 
Gawker met its match against professional wrestler, Hulk Hogan. 
In 2012, Hogan, whose given name is Terry Bollea, sued Gawker for 
posting a tape online showing Bollea having sex with the wife of a 
friend.123 Gawker added a “play-by-play” written narrative of the sex, 
including graphic descriptions of Bollea’s penis and of the sounds he 
made during intercourse.124 Bollea sued under Florida law for public 
disclosure of private facts, invasion of seclusion, and for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.125 Gawker’s defense was that the 
story and photos were in fact news.126 Gawker’s editor testified that 
the public “love[s] to watch famous people having sex” and the 
Internet has made it easier for all of us to be “shameless voyeurs and 
deviants.”127 The jury sided with Bollea and returned a verdict for 
$115 million in damages,128 tacking on another $25.1 million in 
punitive damages.129 The verdict forced Gawker into bankruptcy.130 
 
122 In closing argument at trial, Gawker’s lawyer stressed that exposing what celebrities 
would rather the public not know is “what we want journalists to do.” Id. Plaintiff’s 
exhibits quoted Nick Denton, founder of Gawker, as saying that the site’s standards for 
publication were “raw” and could be “shameless” and “mean.” Plaintiff’s Statement of 
Facts Established at Trial in Support of Plaintiff’s Combined Opposition to Motion for 
New Trial or, in the Alt., for Remittitur and to Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict ¶ 22, Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447 CI-011 (2016), 
http://www.litigationandtrial.com/files/2016/05/Hogan-Post-Trial-Statement-of-Facts.pdf 
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts]. 
123 Bollea v. Gawker Media, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (filing originally 
in federal court); Gawker Media, LLC, v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1198–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2014) (Bollea dismissed the federal suit in favor of proceeding in state court). 
124 Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, supra note 122, ¶¶ 54–55. 
125 Bollea, 129 So. 3d at 1198–99. 
126 Les Neuhaus, On Stand, Denton Justifies Posting of Hulk Hogan Sex Video, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at B2. Interestingly, in both state and federal pretrial motions 
denying Bollea’s request for a preliminary injunction requiring Gawker to take down the 
tape pending outcome of the trial, judges ruled that the sex tape was about a matter of 
public concern, thanks in part to Bollea’s penchant for attracting media attention to his 
sexual life. Bollea, 129 So. 3d at 1202; accord Bollea, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162711 at 
*8–9; Bollea, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1327. 
127 Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, supra note 122, ¶ 73 (quoting deposition of Andrew 
A. Daumier). 
128 Madigan & Somaiya, supra note 13, at A1. 
129 Nick Madigan, Jury Adds $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2016, 
at B2. 
130 Ember, supra note 14, at A1. 
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Gawker agreed to settle with Bollea for $31 million and to forego its 
right to appeal.131 Univision now owns Gawker.132 
Unlike the Rolling Stone case, there was no dispute Hulk Hogan 
was a public figure, even though Bollea attempted to argue that the 
tape was not of Hulk Hogan but of him as Bollea, the private person 
in bed.133 However, the celebrity of Hogan was not dispositive of the 
case. If the tape had been of a candidate running for office, the 
information arguably would have been relevant to voter assessment of 
the candidate’s fitness for office. By contrast, the jury evidently found 
that even a celebrity wrestler had a right to a private sex life and that 
there was no countervailing public concern being served by Gawker’s 
posting a sex tape. 
The jury did not specify its reasons for rejecting Gawker’s defense 
that the sex tape was within the bounds of legitimate news.134 It could 
not have helped Gawker’s cause that, when asked during a video 
deposition whether any sex tape was too private for Gawker to 
publish, A.J. Daulerio, Gawker’s editor, flippantly replied that it 
would be if the tape featured a child.135 If the joke were ever funny, it 
ceased to be when the editor responded to the follow-up question of 
how young the child would have to be: Under “four,” Daulerio 
deadpanned.136 
New Yorker staff writer Jeffrey Toobin singled out the Hogan case 
as an early sign of what has now mushroomed in the Trump campaign 
and presidency.137 Toobin’s takeaway is that Hogan’s lawyers 
successfully harnessed the same “privileged snobs versus the rest of 
us” strategy that the Trump administration uses in its criticism of the 
 
131 Sydney Ember, Gawker Ends a Dispute that Led to Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 2016, at B1. 
132 Maya Kosoff, Peter Thiel Wasn’t Gawker’s Only Tormentor, VANITY FAIR (Aug. 
16, 2016, 3:19 PM), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/08/peter-thiel-wasnt-gawkers 
-only-tormentor. 
133 Nick Madigan, Under Pointed Questioning in Gawker Trial, Hulk Hogan Keeps 
Calm Tone, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2016, at B8. 
134 One member of the six-person jury did give an interview after trial, saying that the 
sex tape “was worse than I expected.” Tom Kludt, Hulk Hogan Juror: “Video Was Worse 
Than I Expected,” CNNMONEY (Mar. 21, 2016, 7:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03 
/21/media/hulk-hogan-gawker-juror. 
135 Les Neuhaus, A Crude Remark, Cross-Examined, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2016, at B3. 
136 Id. 
137 Jeffrey Toobin, Gawker’s Demise and the Trump-era Threat to the First 
Amendment, NEW YORKER (Dec. 19 & 26, 2016 Issue), http://www.newyorker.com/mag 
azine/2016/12/19/gawkers-demise-and-the-trump-era-threat-to-the-first-amendment. 
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media.138 Of course, it took some doing to recast Hogan “the 
celebrity” as Bollea “the common man,” but Bollea’s lawyers took 
every opportunity to portray their client as different from the fictional 
Hulk Hogan.139 
It also helped that billionaire Peter Thiel’s financing of the Hogan 
case remained hidden. Some years earlier, Gawker publicized Thiel’s 
gay sexual orientation, a truth that the PayPal founder had not hidden 
from Silicon Valley associates, but a truth that he preferred not to 
reveal publicly.140 Some see Thiel as the puppeteer of the Hogan 
litigation, remaining hidden while staging the case to silence a media 
organization against which he held a grudge.141 
Thiel is hardly the first person to finance another person’s lawsuit, 
while remaining in the shadows. Gawker lost not because of Thiel’s 
money but because the jury gave its own answer regarding what 
images belong online. The significance of this verdict should not be 
missed. For a “jury to say that a celebrity has a right to privacy that 
outweighs the public’s ‘right to know,’ and that a celebrity sex tape is 
not newsworthy, represents a real shift in American free press 
law.”142 Samantha Barbas’s historical research shows that, in contrast 
to the Hogan verdict, case law by the 1940s had settled on an 
expansive view of journalism where “one surrendered her right to 
privacy to whatever extent publishers felt was necessary to report the 
news.”143 Another scholar finds the same judicial deference to 
 
138 Id. Toobin quotes this line in Bollea’s lawyer’s closing argument before a Florida 
jury: “I’m not so sure all of us are shameless voyeurs and deviants. They may be up on 
Fifth Avenue at Gawker, but that’s a little bit of an assumption for the rest of the world.” 
Id.  
139 Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts, supra note 122, ¶ 1 (“Terry Bollea was raised in a 
low income neighborhood in Port Tampa. . . . After graduating from high school, he 
pursued a career in music. . . . He also worked construction jobs and as a longshoreman to 
make ends meet.”). 
140 Toobin, supra note 137. 
141 See, e.g., Ben Kenigsberg, Read All About It, If You Still Can, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 
2017, at C10 (reviewing a film documentary highly critical of Thiel’s behind-the-scenes-
role); see also Toobin, supra note 137. 
142 Madigan & Somaiya, supra note 13, at A1. 
143 Samantha Barbas, Saving Privacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 1009 
(2012); see also United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 529 n.9 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(“[C]onsidering newsworthiness would cause the court to ‘serve as editor-in-chief.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945, 954 (E.D. Va. 2011)); Solano v. 
Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1089 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Courts are, and should be, 
reluctant to define newsworthiness.”) (citing Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 
139 (2d Cir. 1984)); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (“No arm of the government, including the judiciary, should be able to set society’s 
agenda” for what to debate.); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 484 F.2d 150, 157 (6th 
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publishers’ judgments of newsworthiness in the 1960s and 70s, when 
coverage of the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the 
Watergate scandal gave a “romantic, heroic image” to reporting.144 A 
2005 review found that the levels of judicial deference to the press 
remained high at the time.145 
The Gawker verdict exposes a long-standing problem at the very 
heart of free speech jurisprudence: Just what is newsworthy? I turn 
now to this foundational issue. 
B. Defining “Newsworthiness” 
Consider various positions on how to define newsworthiness, 
including the maximalist, minimalist, and middle positions. 
1. The Maximalist Position 
Gawker’s position was that, so long as it is true, virtually 
everything is news and that courts have no business filtering out 
stories that attract public interest, no matter how seedy the interest.146 
For the maximalist, the market determines the limits of 
newsworthiness—anything that sells is by definition newsworthy.147 
For instance, to adapt an example given by Professor Clay Calvert, 
someone might post a snapshot of his fifth-grade report card, but no 
one would, since who is Clay Calvert? Why would anyone be 
interested in reading his fifth-grade report card?148 The market does 
 
Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (“Only in cases of flagrant breach 
of privacy which has not been waived or obvious exploitation of public curiosity where no 
legitimate public interest exists should a court substitute its judgment for that of the 
publisher.”); Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, 367 P.3d 1006, 1012 (Utah 2016) (“‘News’     
. . . is a concept that has essentially been defined by traditional publishers and 
broadcasters, ‘in accordance with the mores of the community.’”). But cf. Clay Calvert & 
Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference and its Differential Impact on First 
Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 53 (2012) (arguing 
“that deference, as a concept, is too loosely bandied about and trotted out on an as-needed 
basis, rather than being used with consistency, predictability, and analytical rigor”). 
144 Barbas, supra note 143, at 1032. 
145 Gilles, supra note 84, at 1208 n.25. 
146 See Jonathan Mahler, Snark’s Moment of Truth, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2015, at BU1 
(“By Gawker’s definition, if it’s interesting, it’s news.”). 
147 Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment for the Rest 
of Us?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 15–16 (1998) (“[S]ex and scandal . . . must be 
. . . matters of public concern or there would be no way to explain all the concern paid to 
them.”). 
148 Calvert, supra note 110, at 186–88. 
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the work—newsworthiness is not a moral standard but an economic 
one.149 
The maximalist position has little to back it. A 1975 California 
Supreme Court opinion pinpointed the problem with the maximalist 
position when it noted that no one would “be able to enjoy a private 
life save with leave of the press.”150 Weeding out Gawker is not a 
threat to First Amendment rights but a way of protecting the press 
from the abusive overreach of Gawker-type news that has done so 
much to sour public perceptions of the media.151 
2. The Minimalist Position 
If there is a maximalist position, there ought to be a minimalist 
one. However, few media outlets continue the practice of strong 
gatekeeping of the news. Like maximalists, minimalists refer to news 
that is “in the public interest.” But what actually interests people 
might not be in the public interest. Minimalists shift the definition of 
political news from what people want to know to what people need to 
know in a self-governing democracy. The famous box on The New 
York Times masthead—“All the News That’s Fit to Print”—offers a 
moral definition of newsworthiness. Over the years, the Times has 
self-censored the news when it judged that even the truth did not 
serve the public interest, for instance by refusing to publish the day 
and location of what became the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba152 or 
to print the “news” that President John F. Kennedy had been seen 
entering a New York hotel with Marilyn Monroe.153 
 
149 Wagner v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 307 F.2d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 1962) (rejecting suggestion 
in amicus brief that standard in invasion of privacy cases should be “public interest” rather 
than “newsworthiness”); see also BOB DYLAN, Stuck Inside of Mobile with the Memphis 
Blues Again, on BLONDE ON BLONDE (Columbia 1966) (“Your debutante knows what you 
need but I know what you want.”) (emphasis added). 
150 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975). 
151 Clay Calvert, Victories for Privacy and Losses for Journalism? Five Privacy 
Controversies From 2004 and Their Policy Implications for the Future of Reportage, 13 
J.L. & POL’Y 649, 696–97 (2005) (protecting central role of journalism in a democratic 
society may require responsible outlets to distance themselves from egregious invasions of 
privacy); see also Calvert, supra note 110, at 170 (“[T]he bad guys of the quasi-journalism 
world could ruin it for the good guys of the real-journalism one.”). 
152 David W. Dunlap, 1961: The CIA Readies a Cuban Invasion, and the Times Blinks, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/times-insider/2014/12 
/26/1961-the-c-i-a-readies-a-cuban-invasion-and-the-times-blinks/. 
153 See MATT BAI, ALL THE TRUTH IS OUT: THE WEEK POLITICS WENT TABLOID 28 
(2014). 
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The minimalist position suffers from two key problems. First, just 
as a matter of description, it no longer maps onto the actual news 
business we have. There is no turning back the clock on what the 
Internet has wrought—a vast demotion of journalists as effective 
gatekeepers of the news.154 If Wikileaks posts e-mails hacked from 
staff members in Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, The New 
York Times has to cover it as news, whether or not the paper would 
have printed the e-mails on its own. Secondly, as a normative manner, 
it is not clear that a gatekeeping press always serves the core 
democratic goal of informing the people. In the 1970s, the 
Washington press knew that Representative Wilbur Mills, the 
powerful chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had a 
serious drinking problem. However, it considered his alcoholism a 
private matter until Mills drove drunk and crashed his car near the 
Washington, D.C. Tidal Basin. A stripper in Mills’ car then jumped 
into the water.155 The ensuing scandal convinced editors that the 
public needed to know about the fitness of the individual who could 
single-handedly hold up all federal appropriations bills.156 
3. The Middle Position 
Courts, journalists, and law professors have struggled to find a 
sound middle ground.157 The code of ethics recommended by the 
Society of Professional Journalists states that “ethical journalism . . . 
[b]alance[s] the public’s need for information against potential harm 
or discomfort.”158 Many court opinions are along the same lines, for 
instance, a federal court’s recognition that “[t]he right of privacy 
stands on high ground . . . [and yet it] must be accommodated to the 
need for reasonable latitude for the selection of topics for discussion 
 
154 See Smolla, supra note 147, at 7 (“[A] marketplace with ever increasing competitive 
pressures may tend to make serious journalists more tabloid-like.”). 
155 Stephen Green & Margot Hornblower, Mills Admits Being Present During Tidal 
Basin Scuffle, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 1974), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/local 
/longterm/tours/scandal/tidalbas.htm; see also Dennis Hevesi, Wilbur Mills, Long a Power 
in Congress, is Dead at 82, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992 
/05/03/us/wilbur-mills-long-a-power-in-congress-is-dead-at-82.html. 
156 For guidelines regarding jurisdiction over appropriation bills, see Committee 
Jurisdiction, COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/committee-jurisdiction (last visited Aug. 26, 2017). 
157 See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 481 (Cal. 1998) (citing 
to “[t]he difficulty of finding a workable standard in the middle ground” between the 
minimalist and maximalist positions). 
158 SPJ Code of Ethics, supra note 113. 
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in newspapers.”159 In a recent, non-media case balancing free speech 
and privacy, the Supreme Court distinguished the “special protection” 
afforded speech on public matters from the “less rigorous” protection 
given to speech on “matters of purely private significance.”160 A good 
example of the middle position is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision that 
including biographical information on the early-life of a murdered 
model was relevant but that including nude photographs from bygone 
years was not.161 
Like all line drawing, it is one thing to acknowledge that a line 
must be drawn and another to defend the particular line that is drawn. 
In 1977, the Restatement (Second) of Torts sided with protecting the 
newsworthiness of stories even of “deplorable popular appeal,” yet 
permitted plaintiffs to recover against “morbid and sensational prying 
into private lives for its own sake . . . .”162 But that would have been a 
difficult line to discern in the Hulk Hogan case, since the tape 
obviously had “popular appeal”—over five million views—however 
“deplorable” it was. 
The problem with the middle ground position is that it seeks a 
substantive standard for “newsworthiness” (the what of news) when 
really there are only procedural guidelines (who gets to decide what is 
news). In The First Amendment Bubble, law professor and former 
journalist Amy Gajda begins with a classic statement of the middle 
position: “courts will need to . . . [draw] lines in a way that recognizes 
truthful expression’s real harms while continuing to offer protection 
for some truthful, hurtful—but responsible and newsworthy—
reporting.”163 Professor Gajda then proposes what seems to be a 
substantive answer to the question of what is newsworthy. Any 
truthful information is presumptively newsworthy, but the 
presumption can be overcome “in truly exceptional cases” when the 
degradation of a person’s “dignity” caused by the disclosure “clearly 
outweighs” the public’s interest in that disclosure.164 
However, when we probe what human dignity is, or when it is 
degraded in a “truly exceptional case,” this seeming standard has no 
 
159 Afro-Am. Publ’g Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
160 Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[N]ot all speech is of equal First 
Amendment importance . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
161 Toffolini v. LFP Publ’g Grp., 572 F.3d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir. 2009). 
162 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
163 AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI 
THREATEN A FREE PRESS 223 (2015). 
164 Id. at 233. 
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definite substance to offer. Professor Gajda reasonably has to retreat 
to relying on a procedure for drawing the line. To be sure, Professor 
Gajda mentions content that could degrade human dignity (sex, grief, 
or medical condition), but the line drawing is still there, as when she 
approvingly quotes a federal court’s distinction between “the merely 
embarrassing” and the “deeply shocking.”165 
Professor Gajda considers three procedures for who should decide 
where to draw the line around the news: (1) news institutions, with 
old-style deference from the courts; (2) judges deciding the issue of 
newsworthiness as a matter of law; and (3) juries deciding the issue as 
a matter of fact.166 Professor Gajda is hostile to juries; they are too 
easily swayed by sympathetic plaintiffs facing off against large media 
corporations.167 Moreover, even going to a jury trial drives up the 
costs of litigation.168 However, returning to an era of judicial 
deference to newsrooms’ own judgments is not desirable given the 
influx of new media outlets with suspect editorial judgments.169 
For Professor Gajda, this leaves the judge as the proper person to 
decide, as a matter of law, what in fact constitutes newsworthiness.170 
Procedurally, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to overcome the 
starting presumption that any truthful information is newsworthy.171 
One problem is that Professor Gajda never clarifies whether the 
standard of proof is the ordinary one in civil cases—preponderance of 
the evidence—or whether it would be better to require privacy 
plaintiffs to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” that the story 
was “the truly exceptional one” degrading their dignity.172 
A deeper problem with Professor Gajda’s approach comes when 
she warns that judges do not necessarily understand the news business 
 
165 Id. (quoting Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1234–35 (7th Cir. 
1993)). 
166 See generally id. at 222–38. 
167 Id. at 237. 
168 Id. at 257. 
169 Id. at 237. 
170 Id. at 233; see also Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp. 440, 444 (S.D. Ga. 
1976) (citing to cases holding that “whether a matter is of public interest or general 
concern is a question of law for the court”). For a proposal that would call upon judges to 
define baseline norms of responsible journalism and to decide summarily whether a media 
defendant had met those norms, see Barron, supra note 15, at 124 (“[T]he judiciary is the 
body best situated to regulate the press.”). 
171 GAJDA, supra note 163, at 233. 
172 In defamation suits, the standard of proof is “clear and convincing” evidence. 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
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and therefore should seek advice from practicing journalists.173 
Journalism professors will not do—the expertise comes from practice 
in judging newsworthiness.174 Moreover, the judge’s selection of 
experts would somehow have to weed out “quasi journalists” of the 
Gawker variety who do not have experience in ethical news 
judgments.175 At this point, Professor Gajda’s procedures pile elitism 
upon elitism. Not only are juries distrusted, but judges must turn to 
elite experts to know what the public should read, view, or hear.176 
C. A Modest Proposal 
Trying to eliminate all ambiguity in a term like newsworthiness is a 
fool’s errand. We should not expect legal standards to offer more 
certainty than the subject matter allows. That said, the Rolling Stone 
and Hulk Hogan cases illustrate a danger that requires a response. 
New media technologies vastly expand both the number and 
variety of media outlets, together with networks for obtaining and 
distributing the most intimate details of a person’s life instantly, 
globally and graphically. The Internet did not invent gawking and 
gossiping.177 However, it empowers gossip by sustaining what 
otherwise might have just become yesterday’s news. Stories do not 
die but replicate like viruses, spreading from one site to others.  In 
such a media environment, the balance between privacy and publicity 
fundamentally shifts.178 
This is hardly the first time that First Amendment law has had to 
evolve with changing technology. In response to the telegraph and 
telephone, the principles of common carriage developed in the law.179 
In response to radio and television, Congress and the courts pointed 
out technical factors such as scarcity of over-the-air frequencies to 
justify imposing obligations on broadcasters including licenses, 
fairness reviews, and rights of reply that did not apply to print 
journalism.180 Cable television somewhat,181 and then the Internet 
 
173 GAJDA, supra note 163, at 233 (citing to Supreme Court case advising judges to be 
“chary of deciding what is and is not news”). 
174 Id. at 258. 
175 Id. at 245–48 (restricting the definition of who is a journalist). 
176 For a similar criticism, see Calvert, supra note 110, at 186–88. 
177 For much earlier criticism of a privacy-invading press, see generally Samuel Warren 
& Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
178 For the way the Internet remembers all, see Abramson, supra note 108, at 6–7. 
179 See Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871, 874 
(2009). 
180 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–76 (1969). 
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entirely, eliminated the scarcity of media outlets182 and ushered in a 
world where everyone can publish his or her own newspaper 
(website), own a television station (YouTube channel), or be a 
journalist (blogger). It would hardly be surprising for law to adopt a 
less deferential attitude in a modern media environment without 
effective gatekeepers to whose professional judgments earlier courts 
felt comfortable deferring. 
When the Second Restatement of Torts was published in 1977, 
editors were careful to note that the Supreme Court had yet to resolve 
the constitutional issue of whether truth was always a First 
Amendment defense to the charge of publication of private facts.183 
After the Hogan case, the time has come to resolve this issue. If we 
wield the First Amendment to turn truth into an absolute defense, 
there could be no valid invasion of privacy laws left at all.184 The 
Gawkers of the new media world show us the need to respond to 
misuses of free speech principles as mere covers for press arrogance. 
Procedurally, media defendants will still get protection from judges 
dismissing privacy lawsuits upon finding as a matter of law that the 
article was about a matter of “legitimate public concern.”185 Even if 
the judge permits a case to proceed to trial, the burden remains on the 
plaintiff to prove that the story was not a matter of legitimate public 
concern. Trials, especially jury trials, increase the cost of defending 
against a privacy claim and add an element of unpredictability to the 
results.186 But since the underlying issue is whether the public’s need 
to know outweighs the burden on privacy, asking the jury—as a body 
representative of the community—seems the right procedure to follow 
in a democracy.187 
 
181 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 628–29 (1994) (taking notice 
that cable channels are not physically scarce). 
182 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–52 (1997). 
183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
184 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1091–93 (2000) (arguing that privacy laws are frequently so overbroad as to be 
unconstitutional). 
185 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233–34 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting 
summary judgment because no reasonable jury could ignore evidence establishing the 
newsworthiness of the story). 
186 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 15, at 114–20 (arguing that the actual malice rule in 
Sullivan imposes large litigation costs and urging adoption of a summary procedure that 
would avoid trials). 
187 Typical of the procedure in jury trials are the California jury instructions telling 
jurors that the plaintiff must show that “the private information was not of legitimate 
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I acknowledge that imposing liability on truth telling is dangerous, 
and we cannot allow Gawker to be the test case for all conflicts 
between privacy and publicity. Consider, for instance, the situation in 
Europe. The highest court in the European Union, the European Court 
of Justice, has ordered search engines to take down links to truthful 
information about a person if that person requests it and if the 
information is harmful to the identity or reputation of that person and 
deemed “irrelevant” to any public purpose.188 Elsewhere, I have 
given two cheers to this so-called “right to forget” as an 
understandable response to the unsurpassed power of search engines 
to monopolize control over individual reputations.189 However, 
clearly the First Amendment should prohibit importing the European 
solution here in the United States.190 
The press should take this post-Hogan moment to acknowledge the 
headwinds it faces and adopt “best practices” that could provide 
shelter against those winds.191 If journalists feel obliged to get into 
bed with the Gawkers by insisting on absolute free speech rights to 
publish even the most private and invasive stories, then it won’t take a 
weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing. 
V 
PRIVATE CONDUCT OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
More than any other, one development brings concerns about 
reputation together with the debate over privacy. Following Sullivan, 
the Court extended the logic of the case to cover press coverage of the 
private, as well as official, conduct of public officials. That extension 
rested on the argument that the moral character of someone holding 
office is relevant to voters and that private behavior, especially sexual 
 
public concern” and that factors to consider in deciding questions of newsworthiness 
include “(a) the social value of the information; (b) the extent of the intrusion into 
[plaintiff’s] privacy; [and] (c) whether [plaintiff] consented to the publicity explicitly or by 
voluntarily seeking public attention . . . .” CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CACI) § 1801 
(2003), https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1801.html. 
188 See Abramson, supra note 108, at 6. 
189 Id. at 71–78. 
190 In addition to the First Amendment, federal law protects interactive computer 
services from defamation lawsuits if all they did was post or link to content generated by 
others. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). 
191 For suggestions as to what these “best practices” might be, see generally Richard T. 
Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 781 (2009). 
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fidelity to one’s partner, tells us much about moral character.192 A 
more nuanced argument is that it is not the act of sex that is relevant, 
but rather the risk-taking tendency that the act reveals.193 On this 
view, it is not relevant that candidates are actually virtuous towards 
their partners, so long as candidates maintain the appearance of 
sexual virtue toward their partners.194 Another nuanced argument is 
that we are interested in news about sexual hypocrisy rather than 
sexual acts. Thus, stories about the marital infidelities of 
Representative Newt Gingrich and others became relevant in 
revealing a kind of two-faced posturing when they railed against 
President Clinton.195 
The seamless connection between keeping public faith with the 
voters and keeping private faith with a spouse is not obvious. In the 
past, newspapers seemed to have known about the private sexual 
affairs of John F. Kennedy,196 Lyndon Johnson,197 Dwight 
Eisenhower,198 and Franklin Roosevelt,199 yet chose not to publish 
the information.200 Few, if any, made the argument that we could not 
trust Eisenhower as a general if he was committing adultery at the 
time he was the supreme commander of allied forces in WWII. 
Fidelity to spouse was one thing, fidelity to country another.201 
Much has changed since then. The key moment came in 1987 
when press coverage of Senator Gary Hart forced the then-leading 
candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for the presidency out 
 
192 See JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING 
PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972) (arguing that presidential behavior reflects 
basic personality traits); Ralph Gregory Elliot, The Private Lives of Public Servants: What 
Is the Public Entitled to Know?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 821, 826–27 (1995). 
193 See Anita L. Allen, Privacy and the Public Official: Talking About Sex as a 
Dilemma for Democracy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1999) (citing to Bill 
Clinton’s risky extramarital affair while president with a White House intern). 
194 Id. at 1169. 
195 Id. at 1180–81. 
196 BAI, supra note 153, at 28. 
197 Id. at 29. 
198 See KAY SUMMERSBY MORGAN, PAST FORGETTING: MY LOVE AFFAIR WITH 
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1976). 
199 DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, NO ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR 
ROOSEVELT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 517–18 (1994). 
200 See, e.g., BAI, supra note 153, at 28 (recounting New York Times reporter’s story of 
seeing President Kennedy entering a New York hotel with Marilyn Monroe but being told 
by an editor that there was “[n]o story there”). 
201 For this view, see Anthony Lewis, Sex and Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, 
at A19 (“[S]traying from the straight and narrow does not disable one as a statesman, a 
general or a civil rights leader.”). 
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of the race.202 In April 1987, Newsweek published a story mentioning 
persistent reports about Hart’s troubled marriage and his 
“womanizing.”203 Shortly after, a reporter for the Miami Herald took 
a telephone call from a woman saying she had a photograph of Hart 
and a young blonde on a yacht named “Monkey Business” sailing 
near the island of Bimini.204 Following up on the lead, Herald 
reporters staked out Hart’s home in Washington, D.C. and observed 
Hart and a young blonde enter the house and apparently not come out 
until morning.205 
The Herald ran the story as front-page news, at about the same 
time that a feature-length profile of Hart appeared in The New York 
Times Magazine. The Times quoted Hart as responding to reports of 
his womanizing by saying, “Follow me around. I don’t care . . . . If 
anyone wants to put a tail on me, go ahead. They’d be very bored.”206 
The convergence of that remark and the Herald story set in motion 
events from which the Hart campaign never recovered.207 When a 
Washington Post reporter asked Hart whether he had ever committed 
adultery, Hart deflected the question.208 The denouement came when 
the Post let Hart staffers know that they were prepared to run a story 
about another, more long-standing and discreet affair that Hart 
allegedly had with a Washington socialite.209 At that point, Hart 
dropped out of the race.210 
Different lessons can be gleaned from Hart’s fate. A Herald 
reporter maintains that the story was never about sex, but about 
exposing Hart’s hypocrisy in running a campaign based on the “very 
highest possible standards of integrity and ethics,” while cheating on 
his wife and lying to the public about it.211 For others, the takeaway is 
that the press served the public interest by weeding out a candidate 
 
202 See generally BAI, supra note 153. 
203 Id. at 84. 
204 Id. at 77, 83–84. 
205 Id. at 93–97. 
206 Id. at 107. 
207 Transcript of Hart Statement Withdrawing His Candidacy, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/05/09/us/transcript-of-hart-statement-withdrawing    
-his-candidacy.html. 
208 BAI, supra note 153, at 169–73. 
209 Gary Hart and Donna Rice1987, WASH. POST (1998), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/frenzy/hart2.htm. 
210 Transcript of Hart Statement Withdrawing His Candidacy, supra note 207. 
211 BAI, supra note 153, at 92–93. 
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who was reckless enough to utter the “follow me around” 
challenge.212 
I do not find the high-minded defense that “it is not about the sex” 
persuasive, at least in the current media environment. There are good 
reasons why Matt Bai subtitled his study of the Hart exposures “The 
Week Politics Went Tabloid.”213 Political news has become 
entertainment news.214 Granted, there is a difference between a sex 
tape on Hulk Hogan and the public concerns raised by the sexual 
behavior of a candidate or public official. But just how concerned 
should we be? In different ways, Clarence Thomas,215 Bill Clinton, 
and Donald Trump survived widespread reporting of sexual 
misbehavior. This may indicate that the public is not as judgmental 
about the private lives of public figures as the reigning media 
paradigm has it.216 
It might help to distinguish various grounds for covering private 
sexual lives of public officials and candidates. Few doubt that 
evidence of criminal sexual conduct is relevant to fitness for office.217 
Sometimes, however, media investigations reveal conduct that is 
widely considered improper yet may not constitute a crime. An 
example here is the revelation not only that Representative Barney 
Frank visited a male sex prostitute, but that he had used the power of 
his office to fix legal problems for the man. For the same reasons that 
the House voted to censure Frank for ethics violations, the story was 
certainly newsworthy, however lurid.218 Likewise, the fact that Elliot 
Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, frequented prostitutes while 
traveling on taxpayer money and using his office to crack down on 
 
212 Id. at 32. 
213 Id. at title page. 
214 “The . . . collision of sex and presidential politics . . . unleashed something latent in 
the popular culture, some powerful impulse toward gossip and ridicule that couldn’t be 
restrained.” Id. at 170. 
215 See generally JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING 
OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994). 
216 For politicians who have survived sex scandals, see Campbell Robertson, 
Politicians Are Slowed by Scandal, but Many Still Win the Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 
2013, at A11. 
217 Examples here include stories about a drunk Senator Edward Kennedy driving off 
the Chappaquiddick Bridge, off Martha’s Vineyard, killing a young woman passenger, and 
leaving the scene, see BAI, supra note 153, at 20; or the sex plus cocaine affairs of 
Washington, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, see Marjorie Williams, No Sex, Please! We’re in 
Washington, WASH. POST SUNDAY MAG., Sept. 22, 1991, at 15. 
218 See Allen, supra note 193, at 1173 (citing Michael Oreskes, Barney Frank’s Public 
and Private Lives: Lonely Struggle for Coexistence, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1989, at A14). 
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prostitution made the story relevant to his campaign for governor.219 
And sometimes the story really is about risk-taking and bizarre 
behavior rather than sex, as was the case with Congressman Anthony 
D. Weiner’s “sexting” of young girls.220 
The problem is that the litmus test for stories of private sexual lives 
goes way behind the political relevance of the above categories. A 
Google search for “George W. Bush + mistress” returned 3,120,000 
stories, even though none of the usual rationales about risk-taking and 
visibility of affairs applied to the president. 
Suppose, as a hypothetical, The New York Times had accepted an 
advertisement in 1960 critical of Montgomery commissioner L.B. 
Sullivan’s sexual behavior. Suppose Sullivan had sued the Times for 
libel or invasion of privacy. Would the Court have felt it as important 
to protect such an account as one that focused on his public acts in 
arresting Martin Luther King? Even better, suppose a far-right 
publication had exposed King’s private sexual life. Would the 
public’s interest in assessing King as a civil rights leader have been 
served by such stories? 
Let me distinguish three costs of the extension of the New York 
Times rule from coverage of official conduct to stories about private 
affairs. First, media coverage, or even the threat of it, may dissuade 
worthy persons from seeking or continuing to hold office.221 In an 
earlier generation, the litmus test for sexual morality was divorce and 
that standard kept the well-qualified Governor of New York, Nelson 
Rockefeller, from pursuing the presidency.222 Who is to say the 
current tests for sexual morality serve us any better? 
Second, far from serving the original Sullivan purpose of making 
public debate of public issues “robust,” a focus on private peccadillos 
too often distracts the public. Perhaps public attention is not a limited 
commodity; perhaps it even grows when watered first by entertaining 
stories about private matters. But how does reading all about a 
candidate’s sexual lying prepare one to read, for example, about 
whether United States officials deceived citizens into a war by lying 
about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? The 
difference is a difference in kind. 
 
219 BAI, supra note 153, at 191–92. 
220 Robertson, supra note 216, at A11. 
221 “In an age where good men and women increasingly shun positions of public trust 
for precisely this reason, it is not illegitimate to inquire whether society is well served by 
this state of affairs . . . .” Elliot, supra note 192, at 830. 
222 BAI, supra note 153, at 29. 
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Third, there is damage to journalism. This is the hardest to assess. 
In some ways, we live in a golden age of information creation, 
distribution, and access. Journalism is only a small part of the 
information industry, and the First Amendment’s speech and press 
clauses apply to all sorts of information having little to do with 
government. Still, as David Anderson argues, our republic has been 
well served by the existence of an organized press that receives 
special, if uncodified, legal preferences in the form of press pools, 
pressrooms, press releases, and press secretaries.223 These 
arrangements distinguish the press as a business from the rest of the 
information industry in ways that are hard to define but traditional to 
our culture.224 
It is not difficult to imagine, given the current political climate, that 
the press could lose its unique status. Juries roundly rejected the 
claims by Rolling Stone and Gawker that they were practicing 
journalism when they offered up, in different ways, lurid accounts of 
gang rape on campus or sex in the bedroom. Only by combining 
journalistic self-restraint with legal rules that constrain publishers can 
the press preserve its special role as the people’s watchdog.225 
CONCLUSION 
New York Times v. Sullivan can regain its democratic footing by 
bringing in the walls of the First Amendment fort that later cases 
built. In regard to the public figure doctrine, courts should enforce the 
oft-quoted, but frequently ignored, requirement that private 
individuals become public figures only to the extent that they 
voluntarily thrust themselves into a public controversy. In regard to 
privacy torts, truth should not be an absolute defense, however 
uncomfortable such a conclusion is to one reading of the First 
Amendment. Judges and juries will have to continue to struggle over 
norms of newsworthiness when truth and privacy collide. Finally, 
media attention to the private lives of public officials, however 
justified on occasion, has become so routine as to defeat what New 
 
223 Anderson, supra note 16, at 430. But cf. William Bennett Turner, Free Speech in the 
Trump Era: The View from Berkeley, MEDIUM (June 3, 2017), https://medium.com 
/@william.b.turner/free-speech-in-the-trump-era-b46b4dc3ed44 (“[N]o First Amendment 
right of access to government facilities (like the White House) . . . and no president can be 
compelled to grant interviews or hold press conferences.”). 
224 Anderson, supra note 16, at 430. 
225 Id. at 449; see also Stewart, supra note 16, at 632–35. 
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York Times v. Sullivan promised—a press helping citizens to focus on 
the investigation and criticism of official acts. 
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